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ACCOUNTABILITY CONCEPTIONS AND 
FEDERALISM TALES: DISNEY'S 
WONDERFUL WORLD? 
William W. Buzbee* 
MARRIED TO THE MOUSE: WALT DISNEY WORLD AND ORLANDO. 
By Richard E. Foglesong. New Haven: Yale University Press. 2001. 
Pp. xvi, 251. $27.95. 
Richard Foglesong's1 Married to the Mouse: Walt Disney World 
and Orlando, may not offer the thrills of an entertainment park, but it 
is an uncommonly good read. In a book focused on approximately 
four decades of Disney's interactions with Orlando and state officials, 
political scientist Foglesong tells the tale of how Walt Disney ended up 
locating his new East Coast entertainment park in Orlando, Florida 
and what happened in subsequent government-Disney company inter­
actions. Using chapter headings based on stages in a personal relation­
ship's progression ("Serendipity" to "Seduction" through "Marriage," 
and ultimately, after interim stages, "Therapy"), Foglesong shows that 
while the relationship had its birth in a mutual desire for economic 
growth, the government-Disney relationship was also dynamic and at 
times unpredictable. This work is likely to influence debates on sub­
jects as diverse as federalism, land use, state and local government, 
public choice, deregulation and privatization of government functions. 
Compared to most legal scholarship exploring these subjects, po­
litical scientist Foglesong's technique is unusual. Foglesong actually 
conducted substantial documentary research into the Disney-Orlando 
story and interviewed many of the key players. Weaving in the fruits 
of this document review and interview process, the book presents a 
nuanced picture of this increasingly complex and ultimately souring 
forty year relationship between an economic powerhouse and its less 
sophisticated local and state government and business counterparts. 
Orlando granted Disney substantial governmental authority, thus 
making the company a rarity as both the predominant business in a 
city and, in part, its own government. To an extent perhaps unparal-
* Professor of Law, Emory Law School. B.A. 1983, Amherst; J.D. 1986, Columbia. The 
author of this Review thanks Will Haines and Andrea Booher for their assistance, Lisa 
Chang for her support, and Richard Foglesong for sharing drafts of his book and taking time 
to discuss his research. - Ed. 
1. Professor of Politics, Rollins College. 
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leled within the United States, Disney succeeded in controlling both 
market choices and governmental issues within its approximately forty 
square mile kingdom. 
Whether this story of a business that transformed a sleepy Florida 
city into the most popular tourist destination in the world offers 
broader lessons for law and policymaking is a difficult question. 
Disney's breadth, success and audacity seem beyond category. Justice 
Cardozo once spoke of the "tendency of a principle to expand itself to 
the limit of its logic . . . .  "2 Along several different trajectories, the 
Disney World Story goes well beyond usually anticipated limits. 
Pushing propositions well past their usual bounds, however, may just 
reveal the implications of extremity, and not the implications of, for 
example, partial privatization of government functions or business ef­
forts to externalize costs of new development. At times the reader 
may yearn for more in-depth political science analysis, but apart from 
occasional forays into related political science scholarship, Foglesong 
devotes most of his attention simply to telling the Disney-Orlando 
story. Like other classics on urban government and growth, such as 
Caro's The Power Broker,3 this book's principal value may lie in its 
rich tale as itself a source of edification, as well as for analysis by 
Foglesong and others in subsequent scholarship.4 Married to the 
Mouse ultimately succeeds due to the insights offered by its blend of 
historically grounded observations, brief but deft placement of its own 
analysis within political science literature, and a rich story of several 
decades of business-government interaction and reshaping of the legal 
terrain. 
This Essay starts by reviewing highlights of Disney World's first 
forty years, as presented in Foglesong's book and a few other recent 
accounts of Disney World's growth and operations. It then turns in 
Part II to closer analysis of what happens to accountability when pri­
vate and public powers merge as occurred at Disney World. Part III 
examines this book's methodological approach, contrasting its mode 
of analysis with prevailing legal scholarship approaches to examina­
tion of business-government interactions, particularly in literature on 
federalism and motivations of state and local governments. The kind 
of context and history-rich analysis offered by Foglesong constitutes 
an approach generally missing from legal scholarship. Public law legal 
2. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF TH.E JUDICIAL PROCESS 51 (1921 ). 
3. ROBERT A. CARO, THE POWER BROKER (1974). Caro's monumental work is un­
doubtedly substantially different in its painstaking investigation into all aspects of Robert 
Moses's life, but Foglesong's work shares the willingness to look in a sustained way, with re­
course to primary materials and interviews, at his subject. Both also are compelling reads. 
4. Foglesong has already utilized his research in other scholarship. See Richard E. 
Foglesong, Walt Disney World and Orlando: Deregulation as a Strategy for Tourism, in THE 
TOURIST CITY 89-106 (Dennis R. Judd & Susan S. Fainstein eds., 1999). 
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scholarship more typically focuses on legal texts or structures or, in 
scholarship influenced by economic modes of analysis, often seeks to 
discern the nature of business or governments at various levels based 
on aggregate, modeled or statistical analyses. Married to the Mouse 
offers numerous compelling examples of how politics, personalities 
and historical context influenced both legal developments and the 
evolving nature of government-business interactions. As generally 
predicted, a broad consensus in support of economic growth led to the 
enthusiastic embrace of the Disney World project, but later stages of 
business-government relationship revealed a thornier interaction as 
the costs of Disney's growth created burdens and dysfunction. This 
book's ultimate and most valuable lesson is that people and politics 
matter. Utilization of assumptions about predictable or inevitable 
types of business or government actions may be unavoidable, espe­
cially when designing or critiquing regulatory regimes, but such as­
sumptions should be leavened with attention to historical detail and 
context. 
I. THE DISNEY WORLD STORY 
When Walt Disney began to search for a location in the eastern 
United States for a new Disney complex to rival the West Coast 
Disneyland, he and his team settled on a location. They attended a fes­
tive dinner preceding planned execution of documents committing 
Disney to its new venture. When the head of the city's leading busi­
ness questioned Disney's business acumen in planning a tourist desti­
nation that would not sell alcohol - "Any man who thinks he can de­
sign an attraction that is going to be a success in this city and not serve 
beer or liquor, ought to have his head examined" - Walt Disney took 
umbrage (p. 2). As Foglesong recounts, Disney later that evening an­
nounced that the deal was off and Disney and his team would leave in 
the morning (p. 2). The loser? Not Orlando, but Saint Louis, due to 
the imprudent assertiveness of August (Gussie) Busch Jr. Rather than 
a revitalized and perhaps burdened Saint Louis, the Disney World 
team turned its sights to other potential locations. 
Several Orlando business leaders known as the "movers and shak­
ers" had for years sought to create conditions that would lure business 
and growth to Orlando. Their chief tool was to attract non-local fed­
eral and state highway funds for roadbuilding that would make 
Orlando a key transportation hub (p. 17). Led by Orlando's most im­
portant power broker, Billy Dial, and newspaper publisher, Martin 
Anderson, these business leaders succeeded in their efforts. With the 
substantial assistance of "politically insulated institutions" such as the 
State Turnpike Authority and the State Road Board (pp. 22, 23-26), 
these "movers and shakers" succeeded in attracting new highway links 
and expansions that passed through Orlando. Neither these local busi-
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ness and political leaders nor the state knew who or what would be at­
tracted to the area, but they felt confident that with new roads, benefi­
cial business growth would follow.5 
Despite occasionally strong local opposition to the destruction 
wrought by the new confluence of highways running through and near 
Orlando, political deals and the lure of non-local funds succeeded 
(pp. 27-30). By the time Walt Disney turned his eyes to Orlando, the 
city offered a near perfect intersection of major, limited access high­
ways that could be used by the millions of planned tourists (pp. 12, 
14-15). Foglesong's Chapter Two constitutes a modest antidote to the 
oft-voiced assertion in legal scholarship and court opinions that with 
smaller levels of government, greater accountability and sensitivity to 
local citizens' needs will be found.6 This first stage in Orlando's growth 
instead presents business leaders motivated largely by profit and local 
boosterism who, in turn, used state and federal money and politically 
insulated state institutions to transform a city's landscape and future. 
Indeed, little evidence of Disney, state or local government attention 
to broader desires or views of the citizenry appears anywhere in this 
story. Instead, citizens were repeatedly disenfranchised by state and 
local officials who acquiesced in Disney's requests. 
Once Orlando's climate, location and transportation infrastructure 
were found appropriate, Disney began, through stealth and intermedi­
aries, to acquire land near Orlando (pp. 34-35). Seeking to avoid the 
escalation in prices and public scrutiny that would accompany public 
knowledge about Disney's plans, it employed an array of people and 
devices, among them false identification documents, an assortment of 
newly created corporations lacking any name link to Disney, two for­
mer World War II intelligence agents, and an assortment of mostly 
uninformed real estate brokers. They rapidly assembled rights to sub­
stantial portions of the desired 27 ,500 acre parcel (p. 49). 
When Walt's brother and later Disney leader Roy Disney ques­
tioned acquiring so much property for a venture that would actually 
use a far smaller area, Walt offered two explanations. First, he pre­
ferred for Disney to control not only Disney World's core but also the 
surrounding areas. He feared the visual clutter and tackiness that al­
ready surrounded the California-based Disneyland (p. 46). Walt 
5. Pp. 31-32. As stated by an Orlando merchant during a 1960s road controversy, 
"[t)here is no progress without inconvenience to some." P. 22. 
6. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (striking down portion of 
radioactive waste disposal legislation due to its unconstitutional mandate to states either to 
accept federal regulation or take title to the waste and explaining that such a mandate would 
undercut accountability by blurring state government accountability for its actions); Gregory 
v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (stating that "a decentralized government . .. will be 
more sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous society"); Richard Briffault, The Rise 
of Sublocal Structures in Urban Governance, 82 MINN. L. REV. 503, 503-07 (1997) (in as­
sessment of "sublocal" municipal institutions, reviewing economics and political science lit­
erature anticipating local government sensitivity to citizen concerns). 
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Disney also recognized the benefits of ensuring that Disney controlled 
blocks of property in two local jurisdictions, Orange and Osceola 
Counties. Disney would have "more bargaining power" (p. 46). 
Disney was ultimately able, within eighteen months, to acquire a par­
cel twice the size of Manhattan and about the same size as San 
Francisco (p. 49). 
Married to the Mouse then begins to change in tone and content. 
Foglesong offers more removed analytical observations about how 
Disney and state and local government officials interacted early in 
their relationship. Later in the book he begins to focus on how rapid 
growth and an overwhelmingly low wage economy created harmful ex­
ternalized costs for both citizens and local and state governments. 
Foglesong maintains a level tone and scholarly voice. He nowhere cre­
ates the written fireworks of more colorful critics such as Carl 
Hiaasen, who in his short biting essay on Disney calls for "resistance" 
and refers to Disney World as "a sovereign state within a state" that 
succeeded in convincing Florida legislators to �'blitheringly agree to 
give the company whatever it wanted."7 Although Foglesong's un­
favorable assessment of the Disney-government interactions and the 
breadth of power handed to Disney becomes increasingly apparent as 
the book progresses, he backs his critical views with compelling docu­
mentation. 
From the moment Disney acknowledged its Orlando aspirations, 
the company sought favorable legal treatment: Walt Disney stated 
that Disney's grand plans depended on " 'how fast the state will work 
with us' " (p. 51). Walt Disney's exact plans remained vague, apart 
from his revelation that the complex would exceed Disneyland in size 
and would include " 'a model city, a City of Tomorrow' " (p. 51) .  
Much as the scale of its land acquisitions went well beyond typical 
business real property investment, Disney proceeded to secure a re­
markable array of extraordinary political breaks and broad assump­
tion of what are typically governmental powers. Businesses, the press, 
and state and local officials initially saw Disney's plans as a boon for 
Orlando, predicting " 'phenomenal' " real estate growth and 
" 'unparalleled economic returns' " (p. 56). Governor Haydon Bums 
promised the "state's '100 percent cooperation' " (p. 56), and the leg­
islature and state agencies soon delivered. The Disney company was 
able to avoid 40 percent of usual sales taxes on its attractions by con­
vincing state tax officials that a similar percentage of Disney World's 
operations would be research, design and engineering expenses 
(p. 57). To gain the benefit of lower county level taxation for agricul­
tural lands, Disney ensured that cows grazed on company lands 
(p. 57). The thornier and more innovative Disney plan was to establish 
7. CARL HIAASEN, TEAM RODENT: How DISNEY DEVOURS THE WORLD 6, 26-27 
(1998). 
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an autonomous political district that would be recognized by the state, 
be protected from unwanted changes in the legal landscape, and be 
largely immune from typical county government powers over building 
and land use, police, fire and waste treatment. 
Disney's desire for a private government was motivated in part by 
the goal of avoiding the creation of unsightly outside development, 
such as had occurred around Disneyland in California. Walt Disney 
also had an abiding personal interest in effective urban planning 
(pp. 59-60), perhaps rooted in his father's work as a carpenter at the 
White City at the 1893 Chicago World's Fair.8 The Disney planners, 
however, had their work cut out for them in efforts to convert the 
scrub tree and swampy land that would eventually become Disney 
World. In this period before congressional amendments created the 
substantially more rigorous federal Clean Water Act, with its section 
404 "dredge and fill" constraints on wetlands destruction, Walt Disney 
and his minions simply saw a swamp problem requiring an engineering 
cure.9 Not only did Walt Disney himself seek drainage and filling of 
thousands of acres of wetland, but he also wanted to be sure the black 
swamp waters would be converted to a bluish color. "Can you change 
it?" he asked his engineering consultant. When told it was possible if 
he "ha[d] the money," Disney said "do it" (p. 60). 
The swamp conversion required more than just control of Disney's 
swamps and creative engineers. Disney needed either a pliant and re­
liable local government or governmental control for itself. Adjacent 
bodies of land and water were linked. Based on its engineers' advice, 
the Disney company used existing state law to obtain recognition of 
The Reedy Creek Drainage District. Such a district required mere ap­
proval of a circuit court rather than a legislative body, would be sub­
stantially immune from county government interference, and would be 
governed based not on numbers of residents, but on numbers of acres 
controlled (p. 61). 
But the Disney officials needed more than mere drainage auton­
omy. To secure additional immunities from local or state government 
oversight and increase protection of their substantial investment in 
Orlando, the Disney company sought and received advice from con­
sultants to find ways to be " 'freed from the impediments to change, 
8. Foglesong has in another major work on urban design and governance described the 
White City, designed by Frederick Law Olmstead of Central Park fame and Daniel 
Burnham, as part of a larger exploration of urban form within a capitalist market system. See 
RICHARD E. FOGLESONG, PLANNING THE CAPITALIST CITY: THE COLONIAL ERA TO THE 
1920s 124-66 (1986). 
9. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1994) (setting forth substantive and procedural provisions lim­
iting permits for placing "dredged or fill material" into navigable waters). 
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such as rigid building codes, traditional property rights, and elected 
political officials. ' "10 
Acting on this advice, Disney officials advocated the chartering of 
two new municipalities, one of which would be experimental in its de­
sign and modes of governance. As envisioned, it would be an Experi­
mental Prototype Community of Tomorrow, or "EPCOT." This ex­
perimental municipality as originally conceived would lack landowners 
and therefore also lack voter control (p. 65). Around this time, Walt 
Disney succumbed to lung cancer, but the planning continued. When 
the Disney company officially presented its state legislative proposals 
with a more fleshed out EPCOT vision, Walt Disney was on hand, 
through a previously recorded film, to describe this experimental city 
(pp. 66-68). In this often rebroadcast film, Walt Disney described a 
variant on a new urbanist vision, this time complete with actual resi­
dents, coordinated design and minimal reliance on the automobile. 
This early EPCOT vision was substantially different from the com­
mercially underwritten portion of the Disney World theme park that, 
with an international theme, was later built and also referred to as 
EPCOT. 
Disney and its advisors disseminated three proposed pieces of state 
legislation to create Disney's own self governance through the spe­
cially chartered Reedy Creek Improvement District. Although a few 
legislators expressed doubts about the breadth of governmental pow­
ers and immunities granted to Disney, they were reassured by Disney 
representatives. The bills' actual terms, however, gave Disney substan­
tial immunity from state and local regulation. These bills even sought 
to make these protections unusually durable with language requiring 
later explicit repeal of these new town charters before they could be 
subjected to new or different legal constraints (p. 71). These bills, col­
lectively ref erred to as the Reedy Creek charter and creating the 
Reedy Creek Improvement District, were passed largely as proposed 
by Disney after twelve days of debate (pp. 72-73). Some legislators 
who supported these bills later rued them as "one of the worst things 
that ever happened," because they "gave [Disney] too many pow­
ers. "11 The Florida Supreme Court further enhanced Disney's gov­
ernmental powers when it agreed that the Reedy Creek Improvement 
District could issue tax-free municipal bonds, thus enabling Disney's 
new government arm to finance infrastructure with bonds partially 
underwritten by federal taxpayers. 
10. Pp. 62, 230 nn.20-24 (quoting REPORT FROM ECONOMIC RESEARCH ASSOCIATES 
TO WALT DISNEY PRODUCTIONS, EXPERIMENTAL PROTOTYPE CITY OF TOMORROW: 
OUTLINE OF PRESENTATION TO DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT 
20-22 (Aug. 15, 1966) (on file with the Disney Archives)). 
11 .  P. 73 (quoting Henry Land, a legislator who chaired the House Appropriations 
Committee). Land also stated that had he stood up in opposition, "[he] would have been 
lynched." P. 73. 
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Despite repeated planning stage references to a substantial future 
Disney World including a residential community, Disney avoided a 
citizen population for roughly three decades (pp. 70, 72 and 75). 
Disney instead built an entertainment complex that involved only 
tourists and a few temporary or Disney-affiliated residents (p. 75). Un­
til the much later building of the retro-styled Celebration community 
in the 1990s, Disney remained largely unconstrained by the potentially 
unruly presence of resident citizens. As observed by novelist Hiaasen, 
"control has been the signature ingredient of all the company's phe­
nomenally successful theme parks. "12 Even in Celebration, residents 
refer to Disney's influence as that of a "benevolent dictator."13 
Unshackled from the constraints of a local government land use 
review process or building code, the Disney company quickly started 
and in four years completed its massive building project. Water was 
drained, canals built, sludge removed, and the theme park's central 
areas raised twelve feet above the surrounding land. Disney, however, 
did not shirk in the quality of its construction. It created its own 
building code that included features, such as smoke monitors, alarms 
and fire sprinklers, that were then lacking in most municipal codes 
(p. 81 ). Innovations such as underground pneumatic waste removal 
were also created after Disney encouraged technology companies to 
experiment with new ideas at Disney World (pp. 82-83). With such 
control, Disney was able to create a coordinated and cohesive design 
for its theme park. 
Disney's growth both paralleled and contributed to rapid growth in 
the Orlando area. Due to Disney's control of market and government 
decisions within its now state-sanctioned borders, Disney was able to 
coordinate its actions. Local governments, however, rapidly found that 
small city modes of governance were ill matched for a rapidly growing 
region (pp. 92-94). Sporadic efforts by area businesses and officials to 
ensure that growth and necessary public services were adequately co­
ordinated met with failure. Governmental powers and private market 
goals were joined only within Disney's borders. Quickly, the sur­
rounding roads and communities were confronted with poorly coordi­
nated and often dispersed modes of growth.14 Surrounding private 
ventures that sought to divert Disney tourists and compete with 
Disney's attractions and on-site hotels were economically disadvan­
taged due to Disney's local tax breaks and unusual ability to use tax­
free municipal bonds for infrastructure development (p. 94). Due to 
12. HIAASEN, supra note 7, at 69. 
13. ANDREW Ross, THE CELEBRATION CHRONICLES: LIFE, LIBERTY, AND THE 
PURSUIT OF PROPERTY VALUE IN DISNEY'S NEW TOWN 230 (1999). 
14. Orlando's rapid growth and attendant discomforts track those commonly found in 
sprawling metropolitan areas. See generally William W. Buzbee, Urban Sprawl, Federalism, 
and the Problem of Institutional Complexity, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 57, 63-76 (1999). 
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the absence of independent resident voting citizens in Disney's two 
state-recognized towns, Disney's growing and usually low wage work 
force had to turn to other municipalities for schools, housing and other 
public services. These costs of growth were thus successfully foisted on 
other municipalities, the state, or the federal government. 
Not until the mid-1970s did Disney propose a substantial expan­
sion of its theme park. Called "EPCOT,'' this internationally themed 
series of exhibits bore virtually no resemblance to the residential 
model community that had previously been referred to by the same 
name. By this time, the costs of further growth of Disney and sur­
rounding businesses were already apparent. Local and state officials 
began to show modest resistance to Disney's plans. Several state offi­
cials thought this expansion should be subjected to analysis as a "de­
velopment of regional impact,'' as was now generally required under a 
1972 state law intended to rationalize regional growth (p. 101 ). The 
state Attorney General, however, sided with Disney arguments that 
the original Reedy Creek charter protected Disney from obligations to 
comply with this subsequently passed state law.15 Disney thus was able 
to expand without sharing regional planning burdens. As Disney ex­
panded, many other surrounding attractions foundered, unable to 
compete successfully with Disney's subsidized and unfettered opera­
tions, as well as Disney's popularity, smooth running and attractive fa­
cilities (pp. 103-05). 
By the mid-1980s, the vast internationalized Disney company was 
struggling due to cost overruns at Disney World and poor movie reve­
nues. To capture more of the Disney World revenues, Disney again 
began to expand, this time with new hotel construction to keep tourist 
revenues on site. Increasing the density of tourist use on the Reedy 
Creek lands, however, also meant increased infrastructure burdens 
and road congestion. Disney resisted paying for road improvements 
and opposed transportation proposals such as a light rail system 
(pp. 109-11  ). Such a rail system could have eased transportation ills 
and facilitated tourist movement from the Orlando airport to Disney, 
but it would also have facilitated tourist decisions to stay off site and 
15. This Disney-drafted legislation did, in fact, attempt to provide Disney with a poten­
tially perpetual break from other regulatory obligations on the Reedy Creek lands. Section 
23(1) of the charter stated that the "jurisdiction and powers of the Board of Supervisors [of 
the Reedy Creek Improvement District] provided for herein shall be exclusive of any law 
now or hereafter enacted providing for land use regulation, zoning or building codes, by the 
State of Florida or any agency or authority of the state and the provisions of any such law 
shall not be applicable within the territorial limits of the District." P. 102 (emphasis added). 
Although this later regional planning and impact analysis law called for analysis of an ac­
tion's regional effects, and hence did not focus on, for example, on-site impacts of the 
EPCOT construction, Attorney General Shevins read the law broadly to exempt Disney. 
The net effect was to burden competitors' major projects with obligations under this regional 
planning law, including mitigation obligations, while Disney was subjected to no such similar 
burdens and costs. 
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utilize non-Disney restaurants and entertainment. Hints of Disney 
support for light and magnetic rail service did not mature into public 
Disney support, leading interested business leaders and area officials 
to feel betrayed (pp. 122-31). 
Around this time, the Orlando-Disney honeymoon began to end, 
with critical newspaper coverage assailing Disney's failure to assist 
with public needs, Disney's aloof manner, and the off-site impacts of 
Disney's substantial expansion plans (pp. 111-13). Despite belated 
Disney efforts to smooth relations with local officials, irked competi­
tors and local officials began to pursue means to undercut Disney's 
privileged legal status, including a challenge to the constitutionality of 
the Reedy Creek Charter. That challenge was ultimately dropped af­
ter a settlement was reached committing Disney to pay a small portion 
of infrastructure expenses associated with Disney expansions.16 When 
Osceola County tax officials decided to start taxing largely undevel­
oped Disney land at a rate reflecting its "highest and best use," Disney 
fought to keep its privileged low tax rate status and ultimately secured 
a settlement largely splitting the difference (pp. 146-50). 
Foglesong's book gives limited and somewhat superficial attention 
to Disney's use of a private police force that sometimes acted as 
though an arm of the state, but there too Disney only reluctantly con­
ceded ground by distinguishing the appearance of its security person­
nel from that used by county and state police (pp. 137-45). During this 
"negotiation" period, as labeled by Foglesong, state and local govern­
ments began to impose on Disney obligations to pay for costs associ­
ated with its growth, but Disney also continued strategically to use tax 
breaks, bonding authority and negotiation over allocation of costs as­
sociated with growth to minimize these burdens (pp. 150-58). Despite 
Disney's irrevocable commitment to its location and huge sunk costs 
in Disney World, the company still fared quite well in securing gov­
ernment assistance and favored treatment. Local officials became per­
sonally acquainted with their Disney counterparts and expected 
neighborly behavior that often failed to materialize (pp. 172-79). 
The story of Disney's belated inclusion of a residential component, 
Celebration, within the Reedy Creek charter lands has been exten­
sively told by others, so Foglesong wisely focuses on the Celebration 
project as another locus of Disney-government negotiation and strate­
gic behavior.17 Here too, a familiar pattern is found. Disney structured 
the creation and nature of Celebration so this first infusion of poten-
16. Pp. 117-20. Disney's success in securing most of the limited available tax exempt 
housing bond capacity for sewage infrastructure resulted from Disney's circumvention of the 
traditional coordination of such requests through county officials. Furious county officials 
unsuccessfully pursued potential legislative cures or a litigation option, but were unsuccess­
ful. Pp. 131-37. 
17. See, e.g. , Ross, supra note 13. 
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tially independent actual voting citizens would not imperil Disney 
World's governance by corporate control. It therefore de-annexed 
Celebration from Reedy Creek, accepting as the price of this decision 
subjecting Celebration to new state growth management legislation 
(pp. 150-53). Disney still sought to impose these costs on others, with 
some success, and also notably succeeded in building no low income or 
affordable housing in its new town. Few Disney World employees 
could afford Celebration housing, yet Disney ultimately negotiated to 
an agreement discharging its obligation to underwrite housing needs 
with a mere $100,000 per year, three year commitment (pp. 160-61). 
Disney even found means to blunt the power of Celebration's new 
resident citizens, creating a community development district board 
elected on the basis of acres owned. As the largest property owner, 
Disney controlled this board. Detailed covenants controlling resident 
behavior and house aesthetics were administered by residential and 
commercial owners' associations, further minimizing risks of loss of 
control over this new venture.18 Even these associations were con­
strained due to Disney's retention of veto power (p. 164). Celebration 
residents also grew disenchanted at times, especially when Disney's 
apparent commitment to a model public school proved illusory 
(pp. 166-71). 
Foglesong concludes by stepping back from his chronological story 
to summarize the less salutary aspects of Disney World's growth. Due 
to its size, Disney has consistently generated huge tax revenues for the 
state and local governments; indeed, Disney remains Orange County's 
largest taxpayer (p. 180). Disney's favored tax status, however, sub­
jected surrounding counties to unreimbursed public expenses while 
competitors were monetarily disadvantaged. The company's over­
whelmingly low wage workforce created unmet needs for affordable 
housing and social services. Disney's presence and the concentration 
of tourists also attracted a huge number of similar low wage enter­
tainment ventures to nearby areas. Orlando's economy thus was heav­
ily weighted not to high wage ventures, but to a low wage entertain­
ment service industry. All of this growth created transportation and 
congestion problems, and Disney's huge market clout and zealous pro­
tection of its tourist-generated revenues also undercut the economic 
viability of Orlando's old downtown. 
In a closing essay placing the Disney World story in the context of 
other political science scholarship, Foglesong inquires why local and 
state government officials would continue giving Disney special treat­
ment long after the initial rapture of attracting Disney had faded.19 
18. See id. at 223-36. 
19. Foglesong in this closing section offers a detailed recounting of how Disney suc­
ceeded in having built at mostly public expense a costly new highway interchange. County 
acceptance of this obligation followed confusing and questionable claims about the county 
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Foglesong suggests that "regime politics" political scientists offer a 
partial explanation in their focus on particular personal and institu­
tional relationships.20 These multiple "institutional, political, and cul­
tural rather than economic" ties set a municipality into predictable 
behavioral patterns that constitute a form of "path dependence" that, 
in the case of Disney World, "limit[ed] Orlando's choices about its 
economic development" (p. 194). A "large-scale, extended public 
dialogue" about issues such as public and private values, overcom­
mitment to a single employer or industry, and excessive grants of pub­
lic power to a private entity, suggests Foglesong, would have the po­
tential to "transform this one-sided economic development marriage" 
(p. 200). How this debate would actually come about, however, is left 
largely unaddressed except when Foglesong suggests that "political 
entrepreneurs" might be able to seize on Disney-created ills to foster 
such a public discussion (pp. 198-99). 
II. ACCOUNTABILITY AND EXTERNALITIES WHEN THE PRIVATE 
AND PUBLIC MERGE 
The Disney World story presents elements both consistent and in­
consistent with scholarly expectations. As predicted in Paul Peterson's 
foundational City Limits,21 state and local governments fell all over 
themselves for Disney and explicitly sought growth and conditions 
suitable for new investment with its attendant employment, real estate 
and tax benefits. Foglesong focuses on many of the negative side ef­
fects of Disney World, but Orlando's pro-growth consensus succeeded 
to an extent surely envied by the many struggling cities in the United 
States. Orlando attracted a huge employer, a generator of massive tax 
revenues, and a world-famous attraction. Many parents with tired feet 
might vacillate on whether Disney World is a good thing, as surely 
would environmentalists valuing wetlands,22 but many millions of free­
spending tourists apparently view Disney World as a worthwhile fam­
ily investment.23 
location of this interchange. He includes interviews with key officials to discern why gov­
ernment generosity to Disney continued long after Disney was locked into Orlando and 
many of the costs of Disney's phenomenal growth had become apparent. Pp. 185, 188-91. 
Foglesong concludes that multiple personal relationships among business and government 
leaders led local officials to continue their generosity to Disney. Pp. 94-95. 
20. See CLARENCE N. STONE, REGIME POLITICS: GOVERNING ATLANTA, 1946-88 
(1989); THE POLITICS OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT (Clarence N. Stone & Heywood T. 
Sanders eds., 1987). 
21. PAUL E. PETERSON, CITY LIMITS (1981). 
22. See James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and Commodification of Environmental 
Law, 53 STAN. L. REV. 607, 648-65 (2000) (discussing difficulty in commodifying complex 
services and values of environmental amenities such as wetlands). 
23. It has also inspired masterful satires such as Carl Hiaasen's NATIVE TONGUE (1991), 
a skewering of a seedier variant on Disney and other pervasive forms of Florida excess. 
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The Disney World story, however, is far less consistent with opti­
mistic expectations about state and local government sensitivity to 
citizens' desires and needs. Citizens are all but missing from state, lo­
cal government, or Disney considerations and activities. With malle­
able and acquiescent state and local officials rolling out the carpet, 
Disney instead repeatedly sought and obtained authority to bypass 
citizen control or even modest democratic accountability, avoid its fair 
share of growth burdens, and shift to others many societal discomforts 
associated with its kingdom. The state capitulated to Disney's desires, 
giving Disney many of the powers of government, but with no explicit 
requirement that the company answer to resident citizens.24 The 
merger in Disney World of private and governmental control over an 
over forty square mile district shows both the benefits of internaliza­
tion of all private and public functions, but also the likely inevitability 
of efforts to shift costs to others. The breadth of the Disney World 
Reedy charter district did not render Disney immune from running 
roughshod over public concerns when they conflicted with the profit 
motive. As an experiment in the merger of private and public powers, 
Disney World constitutes a mostly cautionary tale. 
The benefits of merging public and private powers are mostly evi­
dent in the planning and building of Disney World. Disney was able to 
carry out its massive infrastructure and building effort in rapid fashion, 
also using its flexibility in building code design to embrace and test in­
novative techniques. As scholars of regulation often assert, reducing 
constraining regulations facilitated private sector innovation.25 
Disney's efficient initial efforts are also consistent with arguments 
voiced in favor of privatization of government functions.26 Disney 
showed vision in creating a coherent and coordinated Disney World 
design, converting a largely swamp environment into a highly engi­
neered and fully conceived entertainment powerhouse. A critic for 
24. Economist William Fischel suggests that homeowners' interest in protecting the val­
ues of their homes leads local governments to be sensitive to citizen desires, including citizen 
interest in amenities such as environmental protection. See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE 
HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: How HOME v ALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES (2001). By circumventing resident 
political voice for over three decades, Disney World avoided what Fischel sees as the key 
determinant of responsiveness to the citizenry. 
25. For a discussion of regulatory reform efforts and the relationship of regulatory bur­
dens, innovation and regulatory design, see THOMAS 0. MCGARITY, REINVENTING 
RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF REGULATORY ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY 
1-6 (1991). 
26. See generally Michele Estrin Gilman, Legal Accountability in an Era of Privatized 
Welfare, 89 CAL. L. REV. 569 (2001) (in critique of welfare privatization efforts, reviewing 
arguments for and against privatization and noting advocates' claims about efficiency and 
innovation); Michael H. Schill, Privatizing Federal Low Income Housing Assistance: The 
Case of Public Housing, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 878 (1990) (in critique of shift of low income 
housing provision from government to private sector, reviewing efficiency claims but also 
noting prevalent risk of market failure). 
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New York magazine suggested that Disney World and its West Coast 
sibling, Disneyland, were the only new towns of architectural signifi­
cance built in the United States since World War Il.27 
Disney designers credited their building and design success to their 
unusual ability to control all aspects of their environment: "We were 
very careful to avoid any contradictions in architecture and design . . . .  
The challenge was not just in the theme park this time but outside the 
park because for this project we had total control . . .  we owned all the 
immediate surrounding land."28 Disney World and the later 
Celebration development thus in some respects resembled, on a much 
larger scale, modest-sized new urbanist developments such as Seaside, 
Florida.29 Seaside's planners and Disney mandated a coordinated aes­
thetic and centrally planned design within an area initially owned by 
one developer. In both settings, the result was a degree of harmony 
and functional mixed uses often lacking in multiple owner, market 
driven urban and suburban developments. Even hyperbolic critic Carl 
Hiaasen notes the "wave of relief that overwhelms you upon entering 
[Disney World] - relief to be free of the nerve-shattering traffic and 
the endless ugly sprawl. " 30 
Despite this merging of private and government control, the 
Disney World story also reveals massive environmental destruction 
and substantial exportation of the negative externalities. Disney's un­
usual power to control and coordinate, as well as easy ability of citi­
zens and local and state governments to attribute credit and blame to 
Disney, did not lead to Disney accountability or acceptance of respon­
sibility. Disney's socially unconcerned behavior and despoliation of 
the environment is in tension with more optimistic views of reliance on 
private market incentives or state and local government regulators. 
For example, "free market" oriented critics of current environmental 
frameworks suggest that with improved property rights and ability to 
trace responsibility for environmental harms, producers of goods and 
bads such as pollution will be subjected to market or common law dis­
cipline and clean up their act.31 Instead, in the absence of later-enacted 
stringent federal wetlands protection laws, Disney filled swamps, re­
routed areas with flowing water and imported sand to change Disney 
27. P. 84 (citing and quoting from Peter Blake, Mickey Mouse for Mayor?, NEW YORK 
MAG., Feb. 7, 1972, at 41). 
28. P. 84 (quoting Press release, Walt Disney Productions, The First 20 Years . . .  from 
Disneyland to Walt Disney World (1976)). 
29. For discussion of new urbanist design, Seaside, and typical sprawling development 
today, see ANDRES DUANY ET AL., SUBURBAN NATION: THE RISE OF SPRAWL AND THE 
DECLINE OF THE AMERICAN DREAM (2000). For discussion of the roots of sprawl and bar­
riers to achieving the new urbanist vision on a larger scale, see Buzbee, supra note 14. 
30. HIAASEN, supra note 7, at 5. 
31. See, e.g., TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, FREE MARKET 
ENVIRONMENTALISM (rev. ed. 2001). 
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World's once murky waters to blue.32 Regardless of larger values or 
services of wetlands, Disney showed no compunction about the con­
version of a complex ecosystem into an environmentally manipulated 
theme park. The profit motive overwhelmed ecosystem values not 
able to be captured by Disney in the market. 
Similarly, Disney's employment of a massive low-wage workforce 
created vast housing and social service needs, yet Disney played the 
political system to avoid paying its share for local burdens. Despite 
new state laws requiring growth proponents to pay impact fees for 
growth burdens, Disney resisted such a burden with its earlier Reedy 
Creek Charter immunity from new legal constraints. Disney similarly 
managed to avoid paying for most road improvements needed to 
service Disney World and killed with its opposition proposals for 
adding passenger rail service to the Orlando area. Disney's success in 
exporting to others the costs associated with its complex continued 
even after local disenchantment with Disney became evident. 
Disney's broad private and governmental powers produced little 
evidence in Disney officials of civic engagement or expanded social 
conscience. Author Foglesong at times appears to expect such social 
engagement, but the reasons for such an expectation are hard to find.33 
Disney, like most powerful private or public actors, preferred to avoid 
public accountability and expenditures of money.34 Despite its assump­
tion of broad public powers, Disney remained in the end a for-profit 
corporation. After initially resisting involvement with community 
projects, it eventually invested modest sums in local philanthropy, en­
gendering good will within the community.35 Disney was invested with 
broad government powers, but those grants of government power 
were subject to no citizen check within the Disney World kingdom, 
and surrounding local and state officials repeatedly showed little 
stomach for taking on "the Mouse." Foglesong soundly questions the 
desirability of giving an entity like Disney the ability to be "selectively 
public" (p. 124). 
In regulatory federalism debates, scholars often suggest that con­
trol of societal ills such as environmental harm should be allocated to 
32. See HIAASEN, supra note 7, at 18. 
33. In recounting Disney's belated rejection of a proposed "Mag-lev" train that would 
have reduced transportation woes, but also would have freed tourists to visit non-Disney 
attractions, Foglesong asks: "This plan raised the question of what they were: a community 
player befitting their public powers, or just another for-profit corporation." P. 124. He criti­
cizes Disney's "ability to be selectively public" P. 124. 
34. See, e.g., David E. Rosenbaum, When Government Doesn't Tell, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 
2002, § 4, at 1 (discussing how the administration of President Bush has sought to keep many 
materials secret from the public). 
35. Pp. 181-82. Foglesong notes, however, that Disney steadfastly resisted entreaties for 
support of efforts to revitalize downtown Orlando, apparently due to downtown's status as a 
potential competitor. Pp. 186-87. 
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the level of government most coextensive with the scale of that harm. 
Professors Butler and Macey have referred to this idea, rooted in a 
few pathbreaking law and economics works, as "the matching princi­
ple."36 Disney World is about as close as one could imagine to a juris­
diction merging private and governmental control over an area the 
size of a major American city. Its governmental powers, however, con­
cededly involved a bizarre form of local governance that included self­
regulation but lacked citizens for thirty years. It is thus difficult to al­
locate responsibility for Disney's environmental and social oblivious­
ness. Nevertheless, in the eagerness to· attract growth, state officials 
actually abdicated most governmental powers to Disney and contin­
ued to provide Disney substantial favored treatment long after Disney 
was "married" to Orlando. State and local governments' desire for 
growth, institutional and personal links to Disney, and adept political 
maneuvering by Disney resulted in the near absence of governmental 
correction of Disney externalities, even those ills borne outside Disney 
World's borders. At a minimum, the Disney tale counsels caution in 
accepting the "matching principle" as a rational for expecting more 
sensitive state and local regulation of societal ills. A fairer take, how­
ever, may just be one that politiq1l-economists Charles Lindblom or 
Albert Hirschman would embrace.37 Both in markets and in politics, 
responsive mechanisms are needed. A government without citizen 
vote, voice or opportunity to exit, may be doomed to ignore citizen so­
cial concerns and harms in favor of purely monetary reward. 
Foglesong finds state and local officials' ongoing willingness to un­
derwrite costs of Disney's growth surprising and contrary to Peterson's 
"growth machine" hypothesis that focuses on economic bargaining. 
Foglesong's suggestion that reduced local willingness to coddle Disney 
might have been expected is supported by international development 
literature. This literature suggests that as a bargain made to lure for­
eign investors to engage in natural resource extraction ages, this "ob­
solescing bargain" will likely result in increasingly antagonistic rela­
tions and efforts to renegotiate original investment terms to favor the 
36. See HENRY N. BUTLER & JONATHAN R. MACEY, USING FEDERALISM TO IMPROVE 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (1996); Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and 
the Matching Principle: The Case for Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 14 
YALE L. & POL'Y REV.IYALE J. ON REG. 23 (Symposium Issue 1996) [hereinafter Butler & 
Macey, Externalities). They, in turn, build on classic works such as Charles M. Tiebout, A 
Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956) and further related works 
such as Vincent Ostrom, Charles M. Tiebout, & Robert Warren, The Organization of Gov­
ernment in Metropolitan Areas: A Theoretical Inquiry, in PERSPECTIVES ON URBAN 
PoLmcs (Jay S. Goodman ed., 1970). 
37. See ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO 
DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970); CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, 
POLITICS AND MARKETS: THE WORLD'S POLITICAL-ECONOMIC SYSTEMS (1977). 
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host government.38 Foglesong hypothesizes that more than economic 
concerns drove ongoing generosity towards Disney. He finds that in­
stitutional and personal ties emphasized by "regime politics" political 
scientists likely explain this apparently economically unnecessary be­
havior (pp. 187-92). Foglesong marshals ample documentary and in­
terview evidence to support his hypothesis. 
One wonders, however, if in his focus on Disney-government in­
teractions, Foglesong may underplay the multiplicity of interest groups 
likely seeking favorable government treatment. He concedes that po­
tential future investors would likely note increasingly adversarial rela­
tions with earlier major investors.39 Relatedly, local and state govern­
ment willingness to fund transportation links necessitated by Disney 
may appear difficult to fathom, but highway construction lobbies, in­
stitutions underwriting the bonds, and citizens suffering from conges­
tion all stood to benefit. Thus, politicians needing to please these in­
terest groups and citizens, as well as needing to show actual 
accomplishments, probably saw improved infrastructure as a political 
boon even if not essential to keep Disney in Orlando. Certainly many 
states continue to invest in highways even where societal benefits are 
difficult to find.40 A reflexive belief in the political and perhaps socie­
tal benefits of economic growth goals appears to remain a prime moti­
vator even as growth's discomforts become apparent. 
Paradoxically, Disney's inward focus, ·obsession with control, and 
lack of concern with external societal ills and costs it helped create re­
semble Robert Heilbroner's critique of the Soviet Union's dysfunc­
tions. In a 1990 New Yorker article, Heilbroner discussed the limited 
competence of overly centralized planning.41 He noted as well that 
devastation of the natural environment was a pervasive problem in the 
Soviet Union, while still posing an ongoing challenge in capitalist de­
mocracies. The fate of the Soviet Union and Disney World are obvi­
ously in no way joined: one "devours the world," as Hiaasen says of 
Disney, while the Soviet Union is now splintered into many struggling 
republics. Still, this combination of forceful central control and mini­
mal concern for off-ledger harms are notable similarities for a paragon 
of capitalism and quintessential communist state to share.42 The overly 
38. For discussion of the "obsolescing bargain" literature, see THEODORE H. MORAN, 
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND DEVELOPMENT 141-45 (1998). 
39. P. 188; MORAN, supra note 38 at 142-44 (suggesting that when developing nations 
seek to renegotiate original investment bargains, they "hurt themselves" by undercutting 
credibility in development bargain commitments). 
40. See Buzbee, supra note 14, at 79-84 (discussing interest group pressures to build 
highways that in turn facilitate sprawl). 
41. Robert Heilbroner, Reflections (After Communism), NEW YORKER, Sept. 10, 1990 
at 91, 99-100. 
42. Repression of dissenting voices may be a further similarity. According to a recent 
newspaper article, when author Foglesong was about to appear on the "Today" show to dis-
· Ma y 2002] Disney's Wonderful World 1307 
complete merger of the private and the public may simply be a bad 
combination, whether starting with a government seizure of market 
functions or a private sector behemoth's successful grab for govern­
ment: power. A separation of functions, with a critical distance be­
tween the regulator and regulated, perhaps would have led Disney and 
Orlando to a more socially beneficial state of affairs. 
III. GOVERNMENT CHARACTER IN DYNAMIC SETTINGS 
What can legal scholars make of . Foglesong's examination of 
Disney-Orlando interactions? Fitting this kind of historically detailed 
tale into contemporary legal scholarship debates is a challenge.43 This 
tale is not set within an economics influenced model of private sector, 
local, state or feqeral behavior, as tends to be the focus of much envi­
ronmental federalism scholarship in recent years.44 It also is not fo­
cused on legal t�xts, especially the Constitution, and what the 
Constitution tells us about how governmental power can or should be 
allocated.45 It also is unlike much political scholarship that in recent 
years is deeply into modeling of voter and government behavior. One 
prominent strain in all of these bodies of scholarship seeks to analyze 
what allocation of government powers will best ensure that govern­
ments act in the public interest and are responsive to citizen needs. 
Assessment of what actually happens in implementation, and why, 
however, tends to be neglected.46 Married to the Mouse, in contrast, 
cuss his book, he was pulled off the show. Earlier, a Disney executive complained to a uni­
versity that had hosted a Foglesong discussion of his research. See Hank Stuever, America 
Loves to Hate the Mouse, WASH. POST, Dec. 5; 2001, at Cl. 
43. See Susan Bandes, Erie and the History of One True Federalism, 110 YALE L.J. 829, 
835, 855-59 (2001) (in reviewing EDWARD A. PURCELL, BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE 
CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL 
COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (2000), noting the dearth of attention to his­
torical context in legal scholarship and suggesting the benefits of such attention). 
44. See, e.g., Butler & Macey, Externalities, supra note 36; Richard L. Revesz, Federal­
ism and Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553 
(2001). 
45. See, e.g., DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A ·  DIALOGUE (1995); Robert A. 
Schapiro, Judicial Deference and Interpretive Coordinacy in State and Federal Constitutional 
Law, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 656 (2000). See generally Symposium, Constructing a New Feder­
alism: Judicial Competence and Competition, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV./YALE J. ON REG . 1 
(Symposium Issue 1996) (paper symposium with an array of articles on regulatory federal­
ism). 
· 46. In the administrative law setting, the now defunct Administrative Conference of the 
United States ("ACUS") provided support for comparable detailed analyses of how federal 
agencies fulfilled their functions. For a few notable works of legal scholarship that explore 
law implementation history, going well beyond written law or theoretical expectations, see, 
for example, JAMES E. KRIER & EDMUND URSIN, POLLUTION AND POLICY: A CASE ESSA y 
ON CALIFORNIA AND FEDERAL EXPERIENCE WITH MOT<)R VEHICLE AIR POLLUTION, 
1940-75 (1977) (describing and analyzing state, federal and industry interactions in control­
ling automobile pollution); JOEL A. MINTZ, ENFORCEMENT AT THE EPA: HIGH STAKES 
AND HARD CHOICES (1995) (analyzing U.S. EPA's enforcement practices and trends over 
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presents a rich picture of state and local government interaction with a 
dominant investor, presented over four decades. Concededly, inter­
views may reveal only what stakeholders in the Disney-Orlando rela­
tionship recall or wish to be remembered, and historical documents 
similarly can only reveal a slice .of what happened and why. Never­
theless, this tale and, in particular, its mode of investigation and analy­
sis, offer several insights for legal scholars. 
Mere analysis of Florida's statutes and regulations would have re­
vealed a state that was slightly ahead of the curve in dealing with re­
gional growth problems and the environment. How state officials ac­
tually implemented their laws, however, was quite different. In reality, 
Florida officials quickly capitulated to Disney requests in handing over 
accountable government authority, largely eliminating citizen voice, 
and in only minimally burdening Disney with a fraction of the regional 
growth costs associated with Disney expansions. The written law 
sounded promising, but the implemented law was far different. This 
contrast between written law or theoretically based expectations has 
similarly been prominent in debates over the "race to the bottom" and 
environmental regulation. Theory might lead one to expect officials 
trading off amenities to maximize public welfare, but empirical studies 
reveal state and local officials ready to sacrifice environmental protec­
tion to attract investment.47 More recent analyses of regulatory rigor 
and innovation present a more complicated picture, but the imple­
mented reality remains largely unexamined.48 For an example closer to 
its first twenty-five years); and Thomas 0. McGarity, Deflecting the Assault: How EPA Sur­
vived a "Disorganized Revolution" by "Reinventing" Itself a Bit, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 11249 
(Nov. 2001) (describing efforts to impose by statute cost-benefit analysis on agencies and 
congressional and U.S. EPA responses to this effort). "Regime politics" scholar Clarence 
Stone suggests that efforts to separate government policymaking and implementation are a 
mistake. Clarence N. Stone, The Study of the Politics of Urban Development, in THE 
POLffiCS OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT 4-5 (Clarence N. Stone & Heywood T. Sanders eds., 
1987). 
47. See Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race­
to-the-Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 
1233 (1992) (stating there is no support for the claim that "without federal intervention, 
there will be a race to the bottom over environmental standards"). For a sampling of the 
criticisms of the theoretical, empirical, and normative observations and implications of 
Revesz's influential article, see Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: ls 
There a "Race" and Is it "To the Bottom"?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271 (1997) (challenging 
Revesz's conclusion with data indicating frequent state laxity); Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing 
Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570 (1996) (concluding that the appropriate 
level of government intervention will vary based on the situation); Peter P. Swire, The Race 
to Laxity and the Race to Undesirability: Explaining Failures in Competition Among Jurisdic­
tions in Environmental Law, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV./Y ALE J. ON REG. 67, 91-94 (Sympo­
sium Issue 1996) (analyzing reasons why states might frequently fail to protect the environ­
ment). For a response, see Richard L. Revesz, The Race to the Bottom and Federal 
Environmental Regulation: A Response to Critics, 82 MINN. L. REV. 535, 545-63 (1997). 
48. See Revesz, supra note 44, at 578-630 (compiling many citations and anecdotes con­
cerning state environmental leadership and innovation, but providing little analysis of his-
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the current home of this Review Essay's author, the state of Georgia 
has on the books environmental laws and regional growth measures 
that appear exemplary. The actual implementation and enforcement 
track record, however, reveals an often lax regulatory climate.49 
Married to the Mouse also suggests that in analyzing government­
industry interaction, one should not assume a static relationship. 
Orlando and Disney initially shared growth aspirations, but as the 
decades passed and the costs of rapid growth became more apparent, 
the cozy Orlando-Disney relationship became more adversarial. A 
snapshot view of Orlando, state of Florida and Disney interactions to­
day might indicate a moderately rigorous regulatory climate, while ex­
amination of the 1960s interactions reveals near absolute government 
capitulation to Disney desires. This relationship changed as Disney's 
investments and growth changed the political and economic underpin­
nings of Orlando and the larger region. This book reveals no persis­
tent state or local government character, but changing goals, alliances 
and compromises, albeit with a sustained but eventually abating inter­
est in economic growth. 
It is hazardous to draw· conclusions about government-industry in­
teractions based on one in-depth longitudinal study, but a few modest 
inferences can likely be drawn. If government-industry interactions 
are dynamic, even at the state and local level where growth goals are 
likely greatest, then rigid recommendations about optimal allocations 
of government authority to local, state and federal officials would be a 
mistake. Dynamic industry-government interactions, if they are the 
norm, mean that effective regulation will at different times depend on 
different power allocations. If the political sphere and regulatory cli­
mate change over time, as· they did in the setting of Florida, Orlando, 
and Disney, as well as in federal-state interactions in hot-button areas 
like environmental law, then judicially enforced static conceptions of 
what the federal government, states or local governments can or 
should do is a mistake.50 Relatedly, cooperative federalism regimes 
torical circumstances leading to such laws or the implemented reality at the state and local 
level). 
49. See, e.g., Altamaha Riverkeepers v. City of Cochran, 162 F. Supp.2d 1368 (M.D. Ga. 
2001) (discussing state of Georgia's lax enforcement practices in concluding that citizen suits 
could proceed against polluters due to lack of "diligent prosecution" by state); Culbertson v. 
Coats American, Inc., 913 F. Supp. 1572 (N.D. Ga. 1995) (same); JAMES HOWARD 
KUNSTLER, THE CITY IN MIND: MEDIATIONS ON THE URBAN CONDITION 41-75 (2001) 
(tracing Georgia and Atlanta's failure to stem dysfunctional patterns of growth and trans­
portation despite late 1990s legislation giving the governor broad powers to address sprawl 
and transportation harms). 
50. See Bandes, supra note 43, at 873-78 (criticizing judicial enforcement of static con­
ception of state and federal roles); William W. Buzbee, Brownfields, Environmental Feder­
alism, and Institutional Determinism, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 1 ,  27-46 
(1997) (analyzing how federal leadership as environmental regulatory "first mover" influ­
enced allocation of federal and state roles and over time created conditions for state assump­
tion of increased regulatory authority). 
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that allow federal and state governments to adjust implementation and 
enforcement duties depending on political will and regulatory capacity 
are likely a sound idea. 
This rich, four decade story of Florida, Orlando and Disney could 
be viewed as a somewhat sordid picture. Public choice scholars apply­
ing their skeptical wares equally to all of the players and actions in this 
book would find many confirmations of jaded versions of rational ac­
tor theory.51 The "law" was not a static baseline guiding private and 
public conduct. Instead, Disney achieved wholesale changes in the 
law, playing the state and local governments to extract benefits for it­
self, while politicians generally went along with most of what Disney 
sought. The state rationally allowed Disney tax-free municipal bond­
ing authority, thereby successfully exporting to federal taxpayers many 
of the infrastructure costs that would otherwise have been locally 
borne. Local business leaders, with cooperation from local and state 
officials, saw federal highway subsidies as a smart way to attract 
growth and hence garnered local benefits with federal dollars. As 
Foglesong notes, local and state officials did on occasion seek to reim­
pose some balance in the Disney-government interactions, but with 
little substantive effect. No actor reveals much interest in less 
monetized amenities such as wetlands or thinks in advance about the 
risks of overdependence on a low wage; tourist-based economy. The 
often unexamined faith that state and local governments will be sensi­
tive to local citizen concerns is repeatedly contradicted. State and local 
officials have their own incentives and goals that, apart from a desire 
for growth, appear only minimally linked to broader public concerns.52 
A more optimistic assessment is that the Disney World story shows 
that regulatory design, institutions, and incentives matter.53 The main 
actors in this story again and again responded to legal and institutional 
incentives. Social engineering through fiscal subsidies facilitated high­
ways and infrastructure expenditures critical to Disney's meteoric 
growth. Where regulation was lacking, such as in wetlands protection, 
destruction followed. Disney's substantial long-term stake in Disney 
World led it to invest substantial monetary, political and human capi­
tal up front to lock in an advantaged position, long before local or 
state officials were equally sophisticated. Even though Disney thereby 
avoided many of the burdens of state regional growth laws, in the end 
51. For an introduction to public choice theories, see DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. 
FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991 ). 
52. But see Clayton P. Gillette, Local Redistribution, Interest Groups, and 
Judicial Competence (SSRN Elec. Paper Coll. No. 293700, 2001), at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=293700 (analyzing substantial and prevalent wealth redis­
tributing programs by local governments despite contrary predictions). 
53. For exploration of how attention to institutions and context is critical to legal analy­
sis, see Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, The Synthesis of Discourse, and the Mi­
croanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393 (1996). 
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it was unable completely to bypass growth burdens and ultimately had 
to surrender some of its legal immunities. This new law modified citi­
zen, official and Disney expectations about what Disney should be ex­
pected to do. By enacting this law, the state made Disney vulnerable 
to bad publicity and Disney was forced to justify its unwillingness to 
share growth burdens. Politics, individuals' efforts and regulatory in­
centives changed the evolving Disney-government bargains. Foglesong 
convinces the reader that government-private actor interactions will 
evolve as circumstances change and institutional relationships mature, 
but increasingly sophisticated and displeased officials still never quite 
came to grips with Disney's power and influence. 
CONCLUSION 
Married to the Mouse offers an exemplary blend of historical re­
search distilled to provide insights into the pervasively important ques­
tion of how dominant businesses and government officials interact and 
bargain. Disney was not given an eternal free pass from legal con­
straints, but succeeded in securing a remarkable array of government 
powers and breaks from government-imposed burdens. Most notably, 
Disney remained consistently successful in avoiding the unpredictable 
presence of citizen power and voice. Despite oft-voiced arguments 
that state and local governments will be sensitive to local concerns and 
citizen desires, Foglesong's analysis is not reassuring. This story calls 
out for counter-stories. Are there other settings in which local and 
state governments, confronted with powerful investor demands for 
market and political power, have more firmly insisted on retention of 
political accountability and citizen voice? How often are assumptions 
of state and local sensitivity to citizen preferences borne out in reality? 
What institutional arrangements lead state and local officials to pro­
vide more balanced treatment of a dominant employer? Richard 
Foglesong's superb book stands as a challenge to legal scholars to dig 
past the surface of written law, to examine the implemented reality of 
how dominant businesses and state and local governments interact. 
